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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
DONG FENG FANG, CHUN LEI FU, ) 
MAO LIN WEI, and HONG MEl ZHOU, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
HEI INVESTMENTS, LLC, HOTEL ) 
EQUITIES DEVELOPMENT III, LLC, ) 
HOTEL EQUITIES GROUP, LLC, ) 
DENNIS A. MERONEY, FREDERICK W. ) 
CERRONE, FRIEDMAN, DEVER & ) 
MERLIN, LLC and SHELDON E. ) 
FRIEDMAN, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
HEI INVESTMENTS, LLC, HOTEL ) 
EQUITIES DEVELOPMENT III, LLC, ) 
HOTEL EQUITIES GROUP, LLC, ) 
DENNIS A. MERONEY, FREDERICK W. ) 
CERRONE, ) 
) 
Third Party Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
) 
Third Party Defendant. ) 
Civil Action No: 2015CV261534 
ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Two cross-motions for summary judgment are before the Court: (1) Third Party 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment 
on Their Third Party Complaint Against Hanover Insurance Company; and (2) Third-Party 
Defendant Hanover Insurance Company's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to All 
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Counts of the Third-Party Complaint. Having considered the briefing of all parties on both 
Motions and the evidence of record, I the Court finds as follows: 
Hanover Insurance Company ("Hanover") issued a Private Company Management 
Liability Insurance Policy (the "Policy") with a policy period from May 15, 2014 to May 15, 
2015 ("Policy Period") to Third-Party Plaintiff Hotel Equities Group, LLC ("HEG") as Named 
Insured. The other Third Party Plaintiffs, HEI Investments, LLC ("HEI"), Hotel Equities 
Development III, LLC ("HED"), Dennis A. Meroney ("Meroney"), and Frederick W. Cerrone 
("Cerrone") claim to be covered by the Policy under the definitions of "Insured Entity" and 
"Insured Individual.,,2 
Under the Policy's terms and conditions, "[Hanover] ha[s] the right and duty to defend 
'Claims,' even if the allegations in such 'Claims' are groundless, false or fraudulent. [Hanover] 
ha[ s] no duty to defend "Claims" or pay related "Defense Expenses" for "Claims" to which this 
insurance does not apply." 
The Policy contains a Directors, Officers, and Corporate Liability Insurance Coverage 
Part ("D&O Coverage Part") which provides coverage to Third Party Plaintiffs for any 
"Wrongful Act" during the Policy Period. "Wrongful Act" is defined as: 
any actual or alleged act, error, omission, misstatement, misleading statement, 
neglect, breach of duty committed or attempted by: 
1. An "Insured Individual" in his or her capacity as an "Insured Individual"; 
I HEG Defendants filed a Request for Oral Hearing, but have withdrawn their Request with the 
consent of Hanover. 
2 Hanover, in its Answer, claims.that some of the corporate entities may Dot meet the defimtion 
of "Subsidiary" and therefore are not "Insured Entities" but this defense to coverage was not 
raised in its letter to HEI denying coverage. In its June 25 Letter, discussed below, Hanover 
assumed that HEI and HED were subsidiaries of the Named Insured HEG, and thus "Insured 
Entities." 
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2. An "Insured Individual" while serving as a director, officer, or trustee of any 
"Outside Entity", if such service is at the written request or direction of the 
"Insured Entity"; or 
3. By the "Insured Entity." 
In June of 20 15, Plaintiffs Fang, Fu, Wei, and Zhou filed suit against the Third Party 
Plaintiffs for failing to return their investment of $1.7 million in a hotel venture that never came 
to fruition ("Underlying Action"). According to the Complaint in the Underlying Action, in 
exchange for their investment, Plaintiffs executed Subscription Agreements for the purchase of 
Preferred Units of Membership Interest in HEI at the cost of §250,000 per Unit. According to 
the Subscription Agreements, the Units were being purchased in accordance with the terms of 
the Private Placement Memorandum dated May 19, 2014 (the "PPM,,).3 Under the Subscription 
Agreements and PPM, Plaintiffs were supposed to receive a complete refund of their investment 
funds if all eleven Units in HEI were not sold by a certain date, or if other conditions were not 
met. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that Third-Party Plaintiffs directed their attorneys, Defendants 
Friedman, Dever & Merlin, LLC and Sheldon E. Friedman ("FDM Defendants"), to take the 
invested money out of an escrow account, and transfer the funds to another prospective investor, 
Black Diamond. The HEG Defendants were negotiating a separate deal with Black Diamond 
that conflicted with the terms of the PPM. Black Diamond neither invested its own money in the 
hotel venture nor returned the Plaintiffs' invested funds even though HEI never obtained eleven 
subscribers. 
Third Party Plaintiffs notified Hanover of the Underlying Action and sought coverage 
and defense under the Policy. In a letter dated June 25,2015 (the "June 25 Letter"), however, 
3 Neither the Subscription Agreements nor the PPM are attached as Exhibits to the Underlying 
Action's Complaint. They were, however, attached as Exhibits to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. All four Plaintiffs signed Subscription Agreements, but HEI failed to sign 
three of the four Subscription Agreements. None of the parties signed the PPM. 
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Hanover denied coverage and refused to defend HEG Defendants based on Exclusion IV.N of 
the D&O Coverage Part ("Exclusion N"). Exclusion N excludes from coverage: 
" 'Loss' on account of any 'Claim' made against any 'Insured' directly or 
indirectly based upon, arising out of, or attributable to any actual or alleged 
liability under a written or oral contract or agreement. However, this exclusion 
does not apply to your liability that would have attached in the absence of such 
contract or agreement." 
Hanover also stated that other terms of the Policy "may serve to limit or bar coverage" and 
reserved its right to amend or supplement its defenses to coverage. The June 25 Letter also 
denied coverage to FDM Defendants, stating that they were not "Insureds" as defined by the 
Policy. 
In response to the June 25 Letter, FDM Defendants, on behalf ofHEG Defendants, sent a 
letter to Hanover stating why Exclusion N would not apply in this instance ("June 29 Letter")." 
Attorneys for Hanover responded with a second letter dated July 28,2015 (the "July 28 Letter") 
again denying coverage and refusing to defend. In the July 28 Letter, Hanover maintained its 
reliance on Exclusion N, repeated its reservation of rights, and listed six other potential 
limitations to coverage. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs filed their Third-Party Complaint in this action on August 10, 2015 
seeking indemnity and defense in the Underlying Action, and raising claims for breach of 
contract, breach of duty and negligent claims handling, bad faith, attorney's fees, and punitive 
damages. In its Answer, Hanover asserting defenses to coverage including Exclusion N and the 
six grounds raised in the July 28 Letter, and adding at least two other grounds to deny or limit 
coverage, including: HEG Defendants are not "Insured Individuals" or "Insured Entities" and the 
claim sought restitution, disgorgement, or the return of ill-gotten gains. 
4 The June 29 Letter also asserted that Friedman met the definition of "Insured." However, 
Friedman has not filed a Third-Party Complaint seeking defense or coverage under the Policy. 
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In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Third-Party Plaintiffs claim Hanover has waived 
all coverage defenses other than Exclusion N which does not apply to Plaintiffs' claims in the 
Underlying Action as a matter oflaw. Alternatively, they argue that even if the application of 
Exclusion N is a question of fact, Hanover breached its duty to defend because the allegations in 
the Underlying Action are at least arguably within the coverage provided under the Policy. 
In its cross-motion, Hanover seeks dismissal of all claims against it because it contends 
that Exclusion N bars coverage as a matter oflaw and therefore it has no duty to defend or 
indemnify Third Party Plaintiffs. If the Court finds Hanover had a duty to provide coverage, 
Hanover contends it had a good faith basis to deny coverage and seek summary judgment on 
Third Party Plaintiffs' Counts II through V for breach of duty/negligent claims handling, bad 
faith, attorneys' fees, and punitive damages. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment shall be granted if the evidence shows that "there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). In insurance coverage disputes, the insurer has the burden of proof to 
establish that an exclusion barring coverage applies. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Erwin, 
240 Ga. App. 816, 818 (1999). 
LA W AND ANALYSIS 
The Court finds the claims raised by Plaintiffs in the Underlying Action are excluded 
from coverage under the Policy's Exclusion N and therefore Hanover has no duty to defend their 
insureds, HEG Defendants. An insurer's duty to pay and its duty to defend are separate and 
independent obligations. Penn-Am. Ins. Co. v. Disabled American Veterans, Inc., 268 Ga. 564, 
565 (1997) (citations omitted). "[W]hether an insurer has a duty to defend depends on the 
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language of the policy as compared with the allegations of the complaint." Hoover v. Maxum 
Indem. Co., 291 Ga. 402,407-08 (2012). "If the facts as alleged in the complaint even arguably 
bring the occurrence within the policy's coverage, the insurer has a duty to defend the action." 
Id. at 408 (citations omitted). "[T]o excuse the duty to defend the petition must unambiguously 
exclude coverage under the policy, and thus, the duty to defend exists if the claim potentially 
comes within the policy." Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Khan, 307 Ga. App. 609, 612 (2011) 
(citation omitted). 
When interpreting insurance policies, the Court should liberally construe the policy in 
favor of coverage and strictly construe exclusions. See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 268 Ga 
App 224, 226 (2004); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Erwin, 240 Ga. App 816, 818 (1999). 
"The underlying facts and circumstances of the claims asserted, rather than the theory of the 
claims, determine whether or not the exclusion applies." City of College Park v. Georgia 
Interlocal Risk Mgmt. Agency, 313 Ga. App. 239, 243 (2011). The Court of Appeals, 
interpreting similar "arising out of' exclusionary provisions, focus on the "genesis" of the claims 
and apply a "but for" test. See, e.g., Id. at 245 (considering whether the subcontractor's claims 
against the city were in any way connected with breach of contract between city and contractor); 
Continental Cas. Co. v. HS I. Financial Servs., Inc., 266 Ga. 260, 262 (1996) (considering 
whether claims against two law partners arose out of a third partner's culpable conduct). 
Hanover argues Plaintiffs' claims are inextricably intertwined with the obligations under 
the Subscription Agreements and PPM, and therefore Plaintiffs' Complaint would not exist in the 
absence of these agreements. Thus, Hanover argues, Exclusion N applies because there would 
be no claims or liability but for the HEG Defendants' breach of the Subscription Agreement. 
This Court agrees. Plaintiffs invested money to become members ofHEl. But for the 
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Subscription Agreement giving them a membership interest upon payment and the sale of eleven 
Units, Plaintiffs would not have paid into the escrow account held by FDM Defendants. The 
negotiations between HEG Defendants and Black Diamond would not give rise to any claim but 
for the terms being contrary to those in the Subscription Agreements. Exclusion N 
unambiguously excludes claims arising out of a written or oral contract or agreement, and none 
of Plaintiffs' claims would exist but for Plaintiffs' relationship with Defendants based on the 
Subscription Agreements and the incorporated PPM. 
HEG Defendants argue that the exception to the exclusion-the exclusion does not apply 
to liability that would have attached in the absence of such contract-leads to a different result. 
First, they argue several of Plaintiffs' claims, such as unjust enrichment and money had and 
received, can only be brought in the absence of a contract. See Fernandez v. Web Singularity, 
Inc., 299 Ga. App. 11, 13 -14 (2009) (citations omitted) (money had and received claim "exist 
only where there is no actual legal contract governing the issue."); Tidikis v. NMCR, 274 Ga. 
App. 807, 811 (2005) ("A claim for unjust enrichment is not a tort, but an alternative theory of 
recovery if a contract claim fails."). However, the underlying facts and circumstances alleged 
are controlling, not the theory of the claims asserted. See City of College Park, 313 Ga. App. 
239 (2011). In the Underlying Action's Complaint, all twenty counts rely on the same set of 
alleged facts: HEG Defendants had an agreement with Plaintiffs regarding their investment into 
HEI as memorialized in the Subscription Agreements and PPM, and Defendants disregarded that 
agreement by transferring money out of the escrow account and negotiating a conflicting deal 
with Black Diamond. As such, no liability would attach absent the Subscription Agreements and 
Exclusion N applies. 
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Second, they argue that Plaintiffs' claim for breach of fiduciary duties against HEG 
Defendants could, under Georgia law, arise from nature or by operation oflaw, not only through 
a contract. See O.C.G.A § 23-2-58. However, HEG Defendants do not cite a source-nature or 
law-which gives rise to fiduciary duties. To the contrary, the allegations in the Complaint cite 
to duties arising directly from the Subscription Agreements and PPM, such as the duty to refund 
money if eleven subscriptions are not sold and the duty to hold money in escrow. Likewise, 
HEG Defendants argue they have raised several tort claims, such as fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation that are wholly independent of the existence of a contractual relationship. 
Again, these counts rely on the same set of alleged facts that would not arise but for the 
Subscription Agreements. The Subscription Agreements are the genesis of all of Plaintiffs' 
claims and thus, Exclusion N excludes coverage. 
And finally, HEG Defendants argue HEI was the only party to the contract among the 
HEG Defendants, and thus the claims against Meroney, Cerrone, HED, and HEG could not have 
arisen "but for" the Subscription Agreements and the PPM. But, as Hanover notes, Plaintiffs 
assert HEG Defendants are jointly and severally liable for breach of contract, and any duties held 
by Meroney, Cerrone, HED, and HEG, as agents or managers of HE I, would be as a result of the 
duties arising under the Subscription Agreements. Plaintiffs have simply not alleged any 
alternative source of a duty held by any of the REG Defendants outside the Subscription 
Agreement that are relevant to their claims. Plaintiffs' asserted injuries flow from the 
Subscription Agreements and the breach thereof, and none of the claims would exist but for this 
contractual relationship between Plaintiffs and HE!. 
Because Exclusion N excludes the claims raised from coverage under the Policy, there is 
no need to determine whether Hanover waived its right to assert other coverage defenses in its 
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Answer that were not raised in its June 25 Letter denying coverage. Furthermore, given that 
coverage was excluded under Exclusion N, the denial of coverage and defense were not in bad 
faith. 
As such, Third Party Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, for 
Partial Summary Judgment on Their Third Party Complaint Against Hanover Insurance 
Company is DENIED. 
Third-Party Defendant Hanover Insurance Company's Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to All Counts of the Third-Party Complaint is GRANTED and final judgment is 
ENTERED in favor of Hanover. 
SO ORDERED this 25th day of April, 2016. 
14§1<.~~ 
JUDGE MELVIN K. WESTMORELAND 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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